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Research in language evolution has increased dramatically over the last two decades. The 
subject is of necessity multi-disciplinary and research from diverse fields of inquiry has 
helped inform the various hypotheses offered for language evolution scenarios. 
Computational and mathematical modelling, evolutionary biology, archaeology as well as 
linguistics are just some of the areas that help shape our conception of the origins of language. 
However, a hitherto untapped area in language evolution research is the history of the subject 
itself. A longitudinal study of certain theories related to the question is worthwhile in that it 
can both highlight the staying power of specific ideas, and perhaps stimulate discussion as to 
why they have persisted. One such idea is that of the holistic protolanguage. This dissertation 
will focus on the persistence of the claim that there was a stage in language evolution that was 
entirely holistic. As such the time-frame I will be looking at will cover the mid-to-late 18
th
 
























PART 1: CURRENT PROTOLANGUAGE THEORY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
A recent series of articles and exchanges on the linguistics web site Language Log 
clearly shows the continuing commitment to certain ideas surrounding the emergence 
of language. These ideas revolve around the conceptualisation of a stage in language 
evolution that has come to be known as Protolanguage. In his guest post on Language 
Log W. Tecumseh Fitch (2009) revives the idea of a Musical Protolanguage stage in 
language evolution by citing the work of Charles Darwin (1871). This theory in itself 
is not without support from other authors and it is therefore not surprising that it 
should reappear again at this time (cf. Mithen, 2005; Brown, 2000). What is 
surprising is the immediate response and critique it provoked from a prominent 
supporter of a competing theory of protolanguage, Derek Bickerton (2009). The 
subsequent (sometimes heated) debate underlies issues I believe to be at the heart of 
thinking about the evolution of language; namely, the question of language’s 
contiguity with animal communication; whether protolanguages that bridge the 
evolutionary gap were holistic or compositional; and how much of language’s 
structural complexity is dependent on an innate, syntactical component versus more 
general constraints acting on cultural transmission. 
Another interesting outcome of Fitch’s article is the reference to an early 
appearance of the idea of a holistic protolanguage by the linguist Otto Jespersen 
(1922). However, an even earlier view that expresses the same idea of holistic proto-
utterances can be found in Bentham (1843)
1
. This idea is still salient today (Wray, 
1998; Arbib, 2005b; Bowie, 2008). Indeed, an entire issue of the journal Interaction 
Studies (Vol. 9:1, 2008), has been devoted to the idea of “Holophrasis vs 
Compositionality”. 
 This review will focus on the history of ideas that relate to the issue of holistic 
protolanguage, and its persistence through the years, be they musical, manual-
gestural, or speech-like in nature. Along the way we will have to consider language as 
related to animal communication in general; the general merits of individual theories 
of protolanguage extant today; and their place in the wider study of language 
                                                 
1
 Much of Bentham’s work was published posthumously by his executor in 1843. It is therefore 
difficult to ascertain the date for Bentham’s Essay on Language. It was probably written in the late 18
th
 
century – much earlier than the publishing date of 1843. 
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evolution. Although the main counterpoint to this theory is taken to be the 
synthetic/compositional view, the focus in this discussion will be holistic theories; the 
opposing view will be limited to the role of exemplifying the differences between 
both whilst devoting the lion share of discussion to the holistic.  
 
 
1.2 NOTES ON TERMS 
In the following review, I will be using a number of terms that are central to some of 
the competing theories of human protolanguage. The central dichotomy to have 
emerged in a number of key books and articles (Bickerton, 1990; Wray, 1998; 
Tallerman, 2007; Arbib, 2005b) is between a holistic (or holophrastic) versus a 
compositional view of protolanguage. An utterance is holistic when it is “a complete 
communicative act” (Arbib, 2008: p.154) exclusively associated with one proposition 
where that meaning is taken from the whole not the sum of its parts, and “there are no 
component parts that could be recombined to create a new message” (Wray, 1998, 
p.51). Wray’s example is characteristic of a holistic meaning-signal mapping: tebima 
would be the utterance and ‘give that to her’ the meaning, with no part of tebima 
‘standing for’ any of the elements in the meaning. 
An important distinction to be noted with reference to the use of the term 
holistic in this essay is with the study of holism in the philosophy of language. In 
particular semantic holism stresses that the meaning of a word or sentence in any 
language can only be understood with reference to the whole of that language (Fodor 
& Lepore, 1992). Here we will only be concerned with the narrower definition of 
holistic as described above.   
In contrast, the compositional depiction of protolanguage stresses that the first 
words were simple one-to-one mappings between signals and their referents, but 
without syntax. More accurately, the route from simple words without syntax to 
words with syntax is compositional, while the protolanguage itself can be referred to 
as synthetic. Modern language characterized in this way conveys meaning through 
expressions that are a function of their sub-parts. In other words the sentence ‘the cat 
sat on the mat’ is meaningful because we know the meaning of the elements it is 
composed of: ‘cat’, ‘mat’, ‘on’ etc.    
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With reference to the holistic route from protolanguage to modern language the 
process has been described variously as segmentation, fractionation and analysis. To 
avoid confusion, especially concerning analysis which can also describe an opposite 
meaning to holistic; I will use Wray’s (1998) term segmentation when discussing 
holistic protolanguage development. For the sake of clarity, the term protolanguage 
as used in this essay will refer exclusively to the hypothesised, intermediate 
communicative stage(s) between a non-linguistic forebear and a language-using (in 
the modern sense) human. 
 
 
1.3 THE HOLISTIC AND SYNTHETIC VIEWS 
Alison Wray (1998, 2000, & 2002) and Michael Arbib (2002, 2005a & b, & 2008) are 
the two most prominent researchers proposing a holistic stage in language evolution. 
In this view communication at some point was effected by means of individual 
utterances that expressed entire propositions. Only later in time did compositionality 
emerge when these utterances were broken down – or segmented – into more familiar 
word-like units. Although both of these authors share certain views – a stage of 
holistic utterances and a process of cultural development that acted on these to yield 
modern compositional language – they also differ on a number of points. Wray (1998 
& 2000) seeks to link directly back to earlier non-hominid communication, citing 
functional similarities between modern human and non-human primates, claiming that 
“holistic utterances in chimp communication are a subset of those in human language” 
(Wray, 2000, p.289).  
Arbib (2002 & 2005b), whilst also discussing a primate link, breaks his analysis 
down into many intermediate stages involving the neural restructuring of a ‘mirror 
system’ of neurons. Arbib also hypothesises a stage of pantomime and ‘protosign’ 
before hominids were then “language ready” (Arbib, 2005b). Wray (2000, p.292) 
acknowledges the need for biological evolution in developing control in the 
“transition to arbitrary phonetic representation” but focuses more on the similarities 
between the social function of communication systems of primates and modern 
human language and the segmentation process (see Tallerman, 2007, for a critique). 
 Bickerton (1990, 1995, 2000, & 2002), contra Wray and Arbib, proposes that 
the protolanguage spoken by our hominid ancestors should be regarded as the simple, 
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non-syntactic concatenation of basic word-like meaning-signal pairs. For a non-
linguist this seems the most intuitively parsimonious given the way we look for 
definitions of single words in dictionaries. 
The core hypothesis proposed by Bickerton (1995, p.51) is that language 
evolution comprises a “two-stage process: first a stage in which there was a lexicon 
without syntax, then a stage in which infinitely productive mechanisms emerged to 
create syntax as we know it”. Although the initial words in the proto-lexicon are 
evolved out of the prior cognitive abilities of pre-hominids (Bickerton, 1990, pp.74-
75), these words in contrast to Wray’s model do not have antecedents in the call 
systems of primates (Bickerton, 1995, pp.56-57). This, Bickerton reasons, is due to 
the proposal that “the antecedent hominid call system and the burgeoning 
protolanguage had to be kept separate” because the reactions to call systems are 
potentially more crucial to an individual’s survival than the uses of protolanguage 
(ibid). The uses Bickerton discusses are ecology-based, so that, again, contra Wray 
(1998), the “selective pressure that started us on the road to modern human language 
cannot have come from social intelligence” (Bickerton, 2002, p.209). Instead the main 
function was to exchange information about foraging and environmental conditions. 
 
 
1.4 MUSICAL THEORIES 
Musical precursors to language have long been hypothesised (Thomas, 1995; for a 
review see Fitch, in press). The related idea that language and music share certain 
properties has fuelled language evolution theories in the last decade (Brown, 2000; 
Mithen, 2005; and Fitch, in press). Earlier writers and thinkers had conceived of a link 
between music and language. Taken together, along with Darwin, these writers link 
language origins with, not only animal cries, but also an explicitly musical stage of 
human communication. The philosopher Condillac (1714-1780) conceives of “A 
primeval song-language” that “is the transition that leads the first societies from 
instinctive cries to language and reflection” (Thomas, 1995, p.72). However, Charles 
Darwin (1871) provides the template for explanations of language evolution using 
evidence from the world of comparative biology (Merker & Okanoya, 2007; Fitch, 
2006). In current models that posit a musical precursor for language, evidence from 
species who use song as a means of display figure largely, due to structural 
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similarities between language and song. There is also a connection based on the 
neural and vocal requirements of birds, for example, to produce streams of organized 
sound. Interestingly, many of the musical hypotheses extant converge on a stage of 





The weight of this review will be on the various theories centred on the idea of a 
holistic protolanguage. This idea goes back to at least the late 18
th
 century in the form 
of Jeremy Bentham’s Essay on Language (1843). Therefore Part 2 will deal with early 
theories of language evolution and thus provide a backdrop against which Bentham’s 
theory emerged. At the same time Part 2 will also deal with how various models, past 
and present, have dealt with the problem of how language, specifically meaning, 
could have arisen in the first place. 
Part 3 will move on from the discussion of meaning to look at the nature of 
holistic utterances themselves, providing a breakdown of the views of two 
contemporary researchers. Wray (1998) and Arbib (2005b) have presented full 
accounts of what they envisage a holistic protolanguage to have looked like. In this 
section I will also look at the relationship with music that other authors have put 
forward. 
Part 4 takes us out of protolanguage and into language, looking at how the 
various theories we have hitherto encountered could possibly have developed into 
modern language. Prominent in this section will be Wray’s (1998) theory of 
segmentation which, to varying degrees, other advocates of the holistic view have 
supported (Arbib, 2005b, Mithen 2005). As an adjunct to this, research in the area of 
computational modelling, which has shed light on the feasibility of a possible 
trajectory out of a holistic protolanguage and into modern, compositional human 





PART 2: THE PROBLEM WITH GETTING MEANING-SIGNAL PAIRS UP 
AND RUNNING 
2.1   ENLIGHTENMENT IDEAS OF LANGUAGE ORIGINS 
 
2.1.1   INTRODUCTION 
The period of history commonly referred to as the Enlightenment can roughly be 
considered to span the cultural and intellectual developments in Europe from the 
1670s to the early nineteenth century (Kors, 2003, p.xvii). The Enlightenment period, 
moreover, represents a marked shift in where learning and the dissemination of ideas 
took place. For centuries the church was at the centre of European education and 
literacy, and learning was to be found in the monasteries and the courts. Thus 
philosophy was aligned with catholic dogma and the natural sciences were made to 
conform to a homo-centric view of the universe, as exemplified by Galileo’s forced 
recant of his astronomical discovery that the earth revolved around the sun. 
During the Enlightenment period, however, there arose the academy or society: 
organized associations committed to discourse in all areas if inquiry – science, 
philosophy and history. Groups could devote themselves to questions  
 
mostly taken from the natural sciences, but academies also concerned 
themselves with language, literature and history – subjects which were 
otherwise pushed into the background by the all-powerful faculties of theology 
and law                                                             (Im Hof, 1994, p.108). 
 
The growth of academies over the entire Enlightenment period charts another trend 
that correlates with the move away from the church. The earliest academies set 
themselves the philosophical task of “the defence by rational argument of the divine 
personality and the moral responsibility of man” (ibid, p.111). However, the rise of 
smaller groups of thinkers and the spread of learning amongst the lesser nobility and 
the emergent middle classes led to an interest in devoting “energies more and more to 
utilitarian ends” (ibid). That is, the focus of inquiry remained the same – philosophy, 
the natural sciences etc. – but the application was increasingly towards “the realms of 
society, economy, law, and human relationships” (Kors, 2003, p.xvii). In short there 
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was an increasing secularisation in European thinking and inquiry. It was in this 
changing climate that a growing number of investigations into language origins arose. 
 
 
2.1.2   EARLY LANGUAGE THEORIES 
Of course, secularisation does not mean philosophers suddenly stopped believing in 
God, nor does it imply that the increase in scientific knowledge and discovery meant 
that man suddenly made God obsolete. Rather, the disciplines themselves – 
philosophy, history, science – existed, and developed, in an increasingly independent 
world from church authority. Thus, as James H. Stam (1976, p.14) notes, early 
language origins theories such as those of Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) framed 
language origins with reference to the Bible. In this view man is created in the image 
of God and Adam, being the first man, is the inventor of language.  
Later theories, notably Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s (1712-1778), moved away from 
the idea of divine origins to claim that “speech being the first social institution, owes 
its form to natural causes alone” (Rousseau & Herder, 1781/1966, p.5). He also 
proposed that language was, of necessity, invented by man who, recognising his 
fellow man as sentient and thoughtful, aroused “the desire or need to communicate his 
feelings and thoughts” making “him seek the means to do so” (Rousseau & Herder, 
1781/1966, p.5). This begs the question: how can sentience and thought be perceived 
in another? What were humans doing, behaviourally speaking, that differentiated 
them from the rest of the world that impelled the need to communicate in a way not 
already instantiated? Stam (1976, p.82) also identifies a similar “cul-de-sac” in 
Rousseau’s conception of language origins; namely that language was hard to 
conceive without prior social organization but that paradoxically social organization 
could not arise without language in place already. 
That this kind of issue was recognized by Rousseau is no small matter, research 
into the topic still stimulates intense discussion. Bickerton (1990, pp.8-9) framing the 
problem in evolutionary terms, highlights what he calls the Continuity Paradox. By 
definition the evolution of language involves development out of a prior system and 
according to Bickerton there is no such system (that is, no communication system). 
Language in his view is primarily a representational system and as such doesn’t fit 
into the continuity models proposed some researchers (Wray, 1998; Arbib, 2005; 
 12 
Mithen, 2005; Fitch, in press). Bickerton (2002) also stresses the need for an 
“ecology-based” account of language origins that takes into consideration the 
difference between early hominids and modern primates environments and argues that 
we can’t take for granted our knowledge concerning hominid environmental 
conditions (Bickerton, 2002, p.213-214). Thus, we have to consider carefully the 
context in which a protolanguage would have arisen, and its use in that environment 
to avoid getting stuck in similar paradoxes. Rousseau similarly rallies against the 
“shortcomings of Europeans” who “philosophize on the origins of things exclusively 
in terms of what happens within their own milieu”, failing to realize that the “human 
race originated in warm climes” (Rousseau & Herder, 1781/1966, p.30).  
There is a striking sense of modernity in some of these theories. Writing in 1772 
Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), as well as denying a divine origin for language, 
recognised that animals are in some sense constrained by their environments; that 
their form and behaviour is a result of the habitat they have adapted to. In relation to 
communication: “The narrower the sphere of an animal, the less its need for 
language” (Rousseau & Herder, 1772/1966, p.105). In contrast, humans, able to exist 
in a wide variety of contexts, must have a more general means of communication. 
According to Herder they have “senses for all things and hence naturally weaker and 
duller senses for each one” (ibid).  
At this point it should be noted that the previous paragraph contains a similar 
chicken and egg scenario to that of Rousseau. Where does the human ability to 
survive successfully in many different ecological niches come from? Is it facilitated 
by having language-like communication that can be applied to many different 
situations? If so then we have to explain how a general purpose language arose in a 
formerly narrow, constraining environment. 
This caveat aside we can illustrate the differences between human and animal 
communication that Herder envisaged. For example, where the Vervet monkey has a 
call system that specifies danger from different types of predator: snake, eagle, or 
leopard; this will elicit appropriate flee responses: look to the ground, seek ground 
cover, or run up a tree respectively. This is all they can ‘say’ and do about the 
predators they are likely to encounter. Human language on the other hand can convey 
information about the size or number of predators; it can imagine the likelihood of a 
predator in the future, or recall a particularly nasty encounter in the past. Language 
users can even choose to ignore the information as spurious. The communication 
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system of Vervet monkeys is thus narrowly confined to its environment as opposed to 
the seemingly endless generativity of language.  
With the advent of evolutionary research, the growing study of ethology and 
linguistics there is a need to clearly delineate between animal communication and 
human language. Herder clearly views animal communication in general as a type of 
language: “the natural language of that animal species” (Rousseau & Herder, 
1772/1966, p.89). But nonetheless it is interesting to note the appeal to an animal’s 
environment as shaping force in its communicative behaviour. 
Although Rousseau ended up in a hopeless paradox concerning language 
genesis, he believed it to have arisen through invention. Firstly language, or rather 
protolanguage, arose distinctly through the modularity of speech rather than 
gesture/pantomime. In distinguishing the senses of sight and sound for 
communicating Rousseau holds the view that pantomime is the most immediate 
method, depending “less upon conventions” and rendering “more exact imitation” 
(Rousseau & Herder, 1772/1966, pp.6-9). However, pantomime as related to action 
seems to be more iconic in Rousseau’s view and tied to the needs of individuals. The 
vital distinction then, which led to the auditory modality being chosen over the visual 
one, is summed up as follows: 
 
“It seems then that need dictated the first gestures, while the passions stimulated 
the first words…It is neither hunger nor thirst but love, hatred, pity, anger, 
which drew from them the first words” (ibid, pp.11-12) 
 
Thus gesture/pantomime is related to the activity of survival and speech to the 
social sphere. Language arose by the “invention of the most ancient words” to help 
select a mate and manage inter-group relationships (ibid). The nature of the words 
was musical and contained much onomatopoeia and imitation; in addition they were 
in the form of aphorisms – short ‘sentences’ that contained truths or maxims. Thus, 
Stam (1976, p.89) interprets meaning to be at the level of the sentence rather than the 
word in Rousseau’s theory. However, we are no closer to a satisfactory answer as to 
how a shared set of arbitrary signal-meaning pairs could have arisen. Herder 
(Rousseau & Herder, 1772/1966, pp.117-118) similarly credits the origin of the first 
words to man’s invention, as a result of reflection on the perceivable world. Through 
perception man is able to distinguish objects in the world and, upon reflection, 
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organize and categorize them based on their characteristic features. Herder’s example 
is the naming of a sheep due to its distinguishing characteristic – its bleat. Unlike 
animals who act according only to instinct, man, “his soul in reflective exercise seeks 
a distinguishing mark – the sheep bleats” (ibid). Repeated encounters evoke previous 
ones and the “distinguishing mark of the sheep became…the name of the sheep” 
(ibid). Thus, humans could be said to have created the first words for objects that 
display behaviours that can be imitated. Herder is appealing implicitly to a pre-
linguistically rich cognitive architecture, albeit one which he sees as being well in 
advance of anything found in other animals (Rousseau & Herder, 1772/1966, pp.105-
106).  
The problem is, again, how the individuals in a group agree on which part of the 
environment corresponds to the newly minted symbol. An issue related to reference 
and meaning is addressed in the work of Quine (1960) who identified what he called 
the “Gavagai” problem. This is the potential difficulty arising between two speakers 
of different languages trying to convey what they mean to each other, but can be 
extended to individuals in the present scenario. To take Herder’s example, if someone 
imitated the aforementioned sheep with the idea of using that imitation as a word 
referring to the sheep then the hearer can’t know exactly what is meant by use of the 
new word. If it merely means ‘there is a sheep’ then the word is of little use if uttered 
to a hearer who can already see the sheep. Even if the sheep is absent, uttering the 
word is hardly going to accomplish much unless your goal is just to put the idea of a 
sheep in the hearer’s mind, which is not particularly useful. Further still, the utterance 
might express a variety of propositions: get the sheep; kill the sheep; avoid the sheep; 
move the sheep etc. The point is that protolanguage as a communication system is 
useful only if it can achieve things that benefit the users, and explaining a 
protolanguage without bridging these fundamental gaps will leave a theory wanting. 
 
 
2.1.3   ANIMAL COGNITION 
Despite taking language origins out of the hands (or mouth) of Adam, Herder and 
Rousseau seem to deny animals the cognitive faculties out of which language might 
have arisen. Herder’s earlier reference (p.12) to the soul still suggests humanity’s 
divine origins, only instead of being ‘given’ language; we were given ‘mind’ instead. 
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However, we can hardly criticise the lack of a theory describing cognitive continuity; 
Darwin was over half a century away and the mental lives of animals is still a divisive 
issue to some thinkers (Hurford, 2007b, p.9).  
The idea that a richer cognitive architecture than previously envisaged preceded 
language is the subject of much of Hurford’s work in the field of language origins. 
Hurford (2003 & 2007a) seeks to provide a “neural basis of predicate-argument 
structure” theoretically depicting a basic representational system in, not only, pre-
linguistic humans but perhaps a larger class of mammals. This system is based on a 
simplified version of mathematician Gottlob Frege’s logical scheme, which allowed 
the mapping from one domain – sentences of a language – to another – their logical 
representations. Hurford (2003) concerns himself mainly with 1-place predicates of 
the form PREDICATE (x), where (x) is a variable taken to be some object in the 
world and PREDICATE is some characteristic that can be attributed to (x) (p.264). 
For example ‘the ball is red’ would be represented as ∃x [BALL (x) & RED (x)]. ∃ is 
the existential quantifier and says (x) exists, the predicates BALL and RED assign 
attributes to (x). The argument of the paper is that these simple predicates correspond 
to properties apprehended by the senses in a wide variety of animals (Hurford, 2003: 
p.264). Furthermore, they existed before human communication and are fundamental 
to concepts in animals (ibid, p.263). Additionally, the variable (x) is correlated with 
instantiations of “whole objects attended to” (ibid, p.275). In interacting with its 
environment an animal will plan its behaviour according to information gleaned from 
its senses. The crucial information will come in the form of the predicate-argument 
structure (Hurford, 2007a, p.535). The rather abstract notion of predicate and 
argument is rooted by Hurford (2003) to the underlying neural correlates in the dorsal 
and ventral visual streams of the brain: “Both cortical streams process information 
about the intrinsic properties of objects and their spatial locations” (pp.267-268).  
Elsewhere, Hurford (2007a) has expanded on this idea by proposing that this 
hierarchical organization was ‘co-opted’ by syntax and that the ubiquitous “S/NP 
distinction [in modern language] now serves a pragmatic communication function” 
(p.528). That is, the Topic/Comment distinction that underpins the handling of new 
and given information in discourse.  
Hurford (2003) stresses that possession of the PREDICATE (x) system is not 
enough to propel a species towards language – it is merely one of the many proposed 
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pre-adaptations that language was able to utilise in its development (p.264). This vein 
of research can, if given further empirical support, provide a fuller picture of what is 
needed to get to the stage of protolanguage. Although Hurford aligns himself with 
Bickerton’s (1990) proposal of a “primary representation system” serving “in the first 
instance merely to label protoconcepts derived from prelinguistic experience” 
(Bickerton, p.91 quoted in Hurford, 2003); the subsequent ‘shape’ of the 
protolanguage is by no means a given. Whether or not the predicate-argument 
paradigm would, from a protolanguages inception, structure utterances in a bipartite 
fashion; or facilitate the subsequent segmentation of initially holistic utterances is a 
question for further research. For the present it is important to note the grounding of 
any protolanguage in a prior cognitive system. 
 
 
2.2   THE ROOTS OF THE HOLISTIC VIEW 
 
2.2.1   JAMES BURNET 
As we have seen from section 2.1.2., some thinkers held to the idea that humanity’s 
ultimate language ability arose out of the expression of emotions and passions. 
Rousseau seems to have had some conception of words as being holistic (he uses the 
term aphorism), associating what we would call words with propositional content 
more equivalent to a sentence. He didn’t develop this idea further so we can only 
speculate about the nature of his aphorisms. 
Although the term ‘holistic’ was not in existence until the early twentieth 
century, one of the earliest theories of language origins to which it might apply, in the 
modern sense of Wray (1998) and Arbib (2005b), is that of Lord Monboddo (James 
Burnet). Monboddo (1714-1799) devoted six volumes to his work Of the Origin and 
Progress of Language (1773-1792). Like Rousseau, Monboddo characterized the 
initial vocalizations made by man as “nothing but an improvement or refinement upon 
the natural cries of the animal” (Burnet, 1773, p.318). Monboddo envisages a steady 
progress or development in the ability to speak. Language arises incrementally from 
cries that have a limited tonal range through to greater articulatory control. 
Articulation gradually improves and more complex vowel and consonant sequences 
are able to be realised. The trajectory from animal-like cries to increasingly fine-
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grained articulation in the vocal tract is clearly, for Monboddo, a discovery: “it was 
natural that so sagacious an animal as man should go on further, and come at last 
to…articulation” (ibid, p.321). Invention, or at least recognition of a good idea, is 
invoked in this theory. Wells (1987, p.20) relates that the earliest communication 
between individuals was proposed by Monboddo to involve facial expressions, 
painting and imitative sounds alongside the cries we have noted. However, man’s 
sagacity led him to persevere with vocal sounds as facial expressions and painting had 
drawbacks when it came to communicating in the dark or at a distance. Thus, through 
continued use the first phonologically structured ‘protowords’ would have developed 
“distinguished only by a few vowels and consonants” (Burnet, 1773, p.322). 
Monboddo is quite explicit about the nature of this stage in his protolanguage, that 
“the first articulate sounds that were formed denoted whole sentences” expressing an 
individual’s desires in the “common business” of the community (ibid, p.395). This is 
a view also to be found in the writings of Jeremy Bentham to whom we now turn. 
 
 
2.2.2   JEREMY BENTHAM 
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) gives us, by far, the earliest and fullest description of 
what we now call the holistic utterance. However, before dealing with his theory of 
language origins it is necessary to look at his motivation for viewing the first 
utterances in this way. Bentham recognized the problems in meaning all too well. His 
study of English law and later of legislation led him to become “conscious of the 
scope for ambiguity and confusion which arose from the wealth of synonyms which 
existed and from the variety of meanings which a single word might have” 
(Dinwiddy, 1989, p.39). Thus, if reform was to be sought in law and legislation it 
must be achieved via the clarification of its language:  
 
Fiction, tautology, technicality, circuity, irregularity, inconsistency remain. 
But above all, the pestilential breath of Fiction poisons the sense of every 
instrument it comes near.  
                          (quoted in Ogden (1932, p.xvii) from Works Vol. I, p.235) 
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Indeed, as Ogden (pp.xx-xxi) notes in his introduction to Bentham’s Theory of 
Fictions, the “Fictions of Law” were to occupy Bentham to the extent that he 
postponed publication of An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
(1789) until he had dealt sufficiently with this problem. Furthermore, “many of the 
most illuminating footnotes are concerned with linguistic difficulties and particularly 
with ramifications of fictional analysis” (ibid, p.xxi).  
The Fictions of Law can be characterised by way of example. Definition for 
Bentham involves the categorisation of objects into genera, species and sub-species, 
and definition is the logical result of apprehending “some peculiar character or quality 
by which it stands distinguished from all other objects included in that same 
collection – from all other species of that same genus” (Bentham, 1843, Works Vol. 
VIII, p.593, italics in original). So for concrete objects such as ‘table’ we could define 
it with reference to its membership of the genus ‘furniture’. Additionally, we can 
refine the definition by distinguishing our ‘table’ from other species of furniture by 
listing its characteristic features in contra-distinction to other types of furniture. In 
contrast, the words  ‘right’, ‘power’ and ‘obligation’ (in their legal sense) to use 
Bentham’s examples, although in the same word class (i.e. nouns) cannot be defined 
as above; none of these words is a “species of anything” (Ogden, p.lxxvii). They are 
thus characterised as “fictitious entities”. They are not real in the way that tables, 
chairs or animals are and cannot be defined in terms of a hierarchy of sense relations. 
The problem with reference to law and legislation is that words such as ‘obligation’ 
lack, in Bentham’s view, a clear definition and undergo a kind of reification that only 
belongs to ‘real’ entities (Ogden, p.7).                                                                                                                                                 
Bentham’s initial motivation for inquiries of a linguistic nature was thus bound 
to the problem of meaning, specifically of meaning in relation to law. For Bentham, 
language was closely tied to logic (Dinwiddy, 1989, p.39), and it is in the philosophy 
of logic where recognition of his theories on language is to be found (Quine, 1966). 
The answer to ambiguity in meaning, however, came in the form of Bentham’s 




2.2.3   THE THEORY OF FICTIONS  
Bentham’s theory held that the subject matter of thought, language and perception 
were entities. That is, anything representable by a noun-substantive (i.e. a noun 
denoting an object, material or immaterial). In addition entities are divided into 
perceptible or inferential: perceptible entities are apprehended by people empirically 
through the “immediate testimony of their senses”; inferential entities are conversely 
only known through “reflection…inferred from a chain of reasoning” (Ogden, pp.7-
8). A further bipartite distinction is made for both perceptible and inferential entities 
and that is that they can be either real or fictitious. 
As we have seen above the distinction between the real and the fictitious rests 
upon whether we can define it successfully or not. Real, perceptible entities having an 
objective physical presence can be defined in a categorical way with reference to real 
world properties. On subsequent occasions can be brought to mind in their absence by 
use of that word. Real inferential entities are not available to the human senses but are 
postulated through a reasoning process. Thus Bentham can class the soul as such an 
entity 
Fictional entities, however, require a different explanatory process from that of 
definition. If the use of words that describe fictitious entities are defined without 
caution they can cause “a propensity and disposition to suppose the existence, the real 
existence, of a correspondent object” (Ogden, 1932, p.xxxv). Overcoming this 
confusion “involved defining a term not by presenting a direct equivalent of it, but by 
what Bentham called paraphrasis:  by providing equivalents of all desired sentences 
containing the term” (Quine, 1966, p.659). From this logical analysis of the semantics 
of words and their definitions came the proposal that the earliest words were holistic 
in nature: “their language is all in propositions” (Bentham, 1843, Works Vol VIII, 
p.322). The nature of holistic utterances will be dealt with in section 3. For the present 
we should note that although Bentham based his description of an early protolanguage 
on his logical analysis of modern language, his thoughts about the ultimate origin of 
this communication system were similar to his contemporaries. Like them and every 
researcher since, we can only hypothesize how a putative protolanguage emerged. 
His treatment of meaning, however, is certainly relevant today. It is apparent 
that the holistic view has persisted within theories of language evolution; but it was 
also invoked in the mid-nineteenth century in the form of Bentham’s concept of 
paraphrasis.  
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Willard Quine’s (1966) recognition of Bentham as a precursor of ideas to be 
found in Gottlo Frege’s (1848-1925) and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) highlights a 
central problem in semantics: the relationship between meaning, truth and object 
(Quine, 1960, ch.1). Frege is quoted as saying: “We ought always to keep before our 
eyes a complete proposition. Only in a proposition have the words really a 
meaning…It is enough if the proposition taken as a whole has a sense” (quoted in 
Hallett, 1967, p.10).  
There is an idea that the communicative-pragmatic aspect of language deals with 
propositions in there entirety. Sentences that we use day-to-day in order to socially 
navigate our interactions, whilst capable of yielding a full syntactic analysis, are often 
processed ‘whole’. For example “how do you do?” or “can I help you?” are cited as 
examples of formulaic utterances (Wray, 2002). 
This, by extension becomes an issue in language evolution – how does a system 
of arbitrary meaning/signal pairs become instantiated in a group of individuals. As we 
have seen, many early thinkers proposed that language was an invention, by early 
humans as a way of expressing their thoughts; Bentham included (cf. Bentham, 1843, 
Vol VIII, p.323). However, the perspective on this scenario has changed given the 
developments in the many fields of science that inform the question of language 
evolution. Indeed, a theory of evolution that was to encompass all living species and 
their behaviour, man included, was not to appear for over fifty years. As we will come 
to see a separate treatment of man, including language was over sixty years away. 
 
 
2.3   OTTO JESPERSEN 
Outlining Darwin’s theory of language origins for a modern audience, Tecumseh 
Fitch (2009) recognises at least one problem in his Darwin “redux”: “complex phrasal 
semantics remains unexplained by Darwin’s model”. Central to a theory of language 
evolution is how and when do arbitrary strings of phonemes come to have the shared 
meanings that they do. How can a symbols meaning be conveyed (by arbitrary 
representations) to someone who does not already know the meaning without recourse 
to yet more arbitrary, meaningless symbols? Darwin’s hypothesis was that “language 
owes its origins to the imitation and modification of various natural sounds” and that 
through mimicry “may not some unusually wise ape-like animal have imitated the 
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growl of a beast of prey, and thus told his fellow-monkeys the nature of the expected 
danger?” (Darwin, 1871, pp.109-110). 
In section 3 we will treat more fully the theory of Charles Darwin (1871) 
concerning language origins. For now it will suffice to note that Darwin’s theory 
helped give shape to the ideas of the early 20
th
 century linguist Otto Jespersen. He 
takes up Darwin’s idea of a singing ancestor and, according to Fitch (2009) remedies 
the semantic “oversight” that Darwin’s theory failed to account for the combining of 
meaning to sung phrases. 
Building on the work of the philologists of the previous century Otto Jespersen 
utilised the most “fruitful source of information” available for any inquiry into the 
origins of language – that is, the history of language (p.416). Two other sources are 
considered: children’s acquisition of their native language and the “language of 
primitive races” (ibid). Regarding the former type of data, Jespersen considers the 
earliest babbling of babies to be a possible area of research in finding “some clue to 
the infancy of the language of the race” (Jespersen, 1922, p.417). This view is related 
(although supporting an opposed theory) to Bickerton’s hypothesis (1990, p.110; 
1996, p.50) that sees the language of children under the age of two as ‘fossils’ of a 
synthetic protolanguage. 
The latter data source we can dismiss, along with Jespersen, linguists having 
rejected notions that so-called civilized societies’ language structure would be 
qualitatively different from those languages used by people occupying a different 
cultural/ecological niche. Any child from any background can acquire any language 
given a ‘normal’ upbringing in a language speaking environment. Jespersen, however, 
does not reject the “languages of contemporary savages” on these grounds for he still 
holds to the idea that these languages may illustrate “a linguistic stage that is nearer to 
that in which speech originated.” (p.27). Rather, he implicitly sees language change 
as, in some sense, directed towards an optimal state: 
 
“it should never be forgotten [that] even the most backward race has many 
centuries of linguistic evolution behind it, and that the conditions therefore may, 
or must, be very different from those of primeval man.”         (p.27) 
 
This kind of view has fallen out of favour in subsequent linguistic research. The 
prevailing approach is that of uniformitarianism: in some sense all human languages 
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are the same. It is true that any infant in the appropriate environment can learn any 
language, but does this say more about the innate learning mechanisms involved in 
language acquisition than the structure of the languages themselves? There is both a 
biological and a cultural element to acquiring a language and cultural changes are 
more rapid, shaped by the performance and cognitive constraints of the language 
community. Whether a languages structure is affected by the cultural environment in 
which it is used is a controversial subject (see Everett (2005) and related comments 
for a study exploring this view). If the syntactic structure of language can be related to 
the uses of a linguistic community then it might have implications for the earliest 
structure of language tied to the needs of its speakers. 
The researches carried out by the likes of Rask, Grimm and Bopp revealed 
tendencies in the way that languages change over time. Studying the comparative 
differences between cognate words in different languages revealed a systematic set of 
corresponding phonemic changes. From these “sound shifts” languages were grouped 
together into language families where current languages descended from earlier 
‘parents’ such as Proto-Germanic and Indo-European (O’Grady et al, p.358).  Thus, 
Jespersen reasoning backwards tries to reverse engineer the likely phonological 
‘shape’ of the earliest primitive language. Noting that in speech there is a general 
“tendency to make pronunciation more easy”, Jespersen reasons that earlier forms 
would be characterized by a higher frequency of “all kinds of difficult sounds” 
(Jespersen, 1922, pp.418-419). Using the same kind of inductive reasoning, the 
disappearance of tonal and pitch aspects in some languages, giving way to stress 
patterns that have obscured the tone element, is argued to support a more musical 
language in the past. As an adjunct to this it is observed that “the modulation of 
sentences [“sentence melody”] is strongly influenced by the effect of intense emotions 
in causing stronger and more rapid raisings and sinkings of the tone” (p.420). In 
contrast, calm, conversational speech oscillates relatively little between high and low, 
the pitch being more monotonous. Jespersen sees the loss of musicality as a result of 
an ongoing ‘civilizing’ process whereby passion is tempered in more complex 
societies (ibid). 
From this reasoning, based on the study of historical linguistics, the conclusion 
is reached “that we must imagine primitive language as consisting …of very long 
words, full of difficult sounds, and sung rather than spoken” (p.421). It is not difficult 
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to imagine that from this the earliest languages would have been extremely 
phonologically complex (Wells, 1987, p.52). 
Let us now clarify and chart the proposed development of language in early 
humans set out by Jespersen: 
 
i. “Our remotest ancestors” sang in an “exclamative”, non-communicative 
way, expressing “an inner craving of the individual without any thought of 
any fellow creatures” (p.436). This is likened to the roar of animals or the 
singing of birds, by which I interpret Jespersen as meaning a lack of 
intentionality.   
ii. From this “frivolous use” the vocal apparatus was exapted to serve an 
increasingly communicative function “so that it became more and more 
fitted to express everything that touched human souls” (p.436). Jespersen 
characterizes this system as “neither deep nor wise” (p.435). 
iii. The next stage deals with the question of how sound and meaning came to 
be associated. For a small number of cases (onomatopoeia and 
interjections) the process was easy and “such words were at once 
employed and understood as signs for the corresponding idea” (p.438). 
However, the bulk of the first words would have been proper names 
referring to distinct individuals. This is imagined to have happened 
through the association of a song or “leitmotiv” with an individual, arising 
through the pairing together of potential mates. Others, noting the co-
occurrence of song and individual, “would occasionally banter him by 
imitating and repeating” (ibid). 
 
In Part 3 we will see that this last idea has persisted and been promoted in a situation 
that sees a musical protolanguage functioning as it does in songbirds (Merker & 
Okanoya, 2007). This too invokes the holistic paradigm by associating songs with 
whole situations or events. However, for the moment we will look at how meaning is 




2.4   THE MODERN VIEW   
Wray (1998), in supporting a holistic protolanguage, appears to sidestep the issues of 
meaning origins by invoking continuity with primate communication. Wray argues 
that the vocal and gestural signals of primates function in relation to “self-
preservation, the preservation of others and the servicing of and adjustment of 
relationships” (1998, p.51). In this way, the argument goes, the signals are intentional, 
and being employed to achieve a definite effect in an interaction, and are thus 
propositional in content: “The signals are holistic: there are no component parts that 
could be recombined to create a new message” (ibid). But Wray makes no mention of 
the difference between human and primate communication with regard to the fact that 
signals are able to be learned across generations, whereas primate signals are learned 
and negotiated between individuals over a lifetime but not passed on to the next 
generation (cf. Tomasello et al, 1997). This is definitely discontinuous and should be 
accounted for as it is the infants of the next generation that must acquire associations 
between signals and meanings, holistic or otherwise. 
In the “smooth, gradual, and beneficial” development to hominid protolanguage, 
the resultant communication system is imagined to be similar to that of primates “but 
capable of a more complex inventory” (1998, pp.50-51). Continuity is all very well 
but there needs to be more detail if the issue of referential meaning developing is to be 
addressed without having to explain why it isn’t more ubiquitous in other primates. 
The work of Arbib (2002, 2005b & 2008) whilst appealing to the idea of 
continuity, has also stressed the importance of a pantomimic stage in human language 
evolution. The crucial bridge that needs to be crossed in getting to a “language-ready 
brain” is grounding symbols between speakers and hearers, so that what counts for the 
speaker correspondingly counts for the hearer (Arbib, 2005, p.105). Arbib refers to 
this as the “parity requirement” (ibid, p.106). This requirement is met “because 
Broca’s area evolved atop the mirror system for grasping, with its capacity to generate 
and recognize a set of actions” (ibid).  
The crux of Arbib’s argument, then, rests on the substantial body of research 
outlining the so-called Mirror Neurons and their implication in language evolution 
(see Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998 for an overview). According to this hypothesis there 
exist a class of neurons – in an area of the monkey brain known as F5 – called mirror 
neurons. These are active when certain actions are performed by a monkey and also 
when those same actions are observed. Area F5 of the monkey brain has a 
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homologous region in the human brain which is part of Broca’s Area – one area 
associated with speech. Not only is Broca’s Area associated with grasping gestures it 
is implicated in comprehending sentences and has been linked to Wernicke’s Area – a 
region of the brain related to sentence production (Lieberman, 2006, pp.196-197; 
Arbib, 2005, p.106). 
The mirror system, which is thought to have been present in the common 
ancestor of monkey and human, is hypothesized to have further developed in the 
common ancestor of humans and chimpanzees – around 5-6 m.y.a. The resulting 
system is said to facilitate simple imitation: “imitation of short, novel sequences of 
object-directed actions through repeated exposure” (Arbib, 2005, p.115). The 
Rubicon, if you will, that then sets the stage for hominid development is the evolved 
brain mechanisms that allow for complex imitation: “acquiring (longer) novel 
sequences of more abstract actions in a single trial” (ibid). In Part 3.4 it will be seen 
that the mirror system provides the foundation for a complex, evolutionary scenario 
where manual, as well as vocal, gestures evolve in tandem.  
 
 
2.5   THE PAST RE-IMAGINED 





 centuries – there was vigorous interest in the question of 
language origins. Aarsleff (1982, p.147) identifies the 18
th
 century as one which 
debated the question of language with “greater zeal, frequency, consistency, and depth 
of insight” than any other. Had he been writing today Aarsleff might have remarked 
that with the progress of modern science, the 18
th
 century zeal for inquiry into 
language origins has found its mirror in the burgeoning research and literature in the 
field over the last two decades. Furthermore, it might be argued that the parallel 
extends to the fact that interest in the question was, in part, motivated by the causal 
factor of scientific progress. 
The Enlightenment period saw acceptance of Newtonian physics, the beginnings 
of the Industrial Revolution and the increasing spread of knowledge in general 
through the academies, books and encyclopaedias (Heilbron, 2003, p.134). In our own 
time we have seen the human genome mapped, the brain investigated in ever more 
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detail and the development of computers such that they provide powerful ways of 
modelling sophisticated and dynamic systems (for instance language) over time. 
However, despite the relative sophistication of technology and a concomitant 
increase in information, a good idea is a good idea, regardless of time and place. This 
is perhaps why we can see so much overlap between theories of language evolution 
from the 18
th
 century and those of the last twenty years. Early theories are necessarily 
framed by the state knowledge available at the time and the tools available to test 
these theories. In the subsequent sections the nature of various holistic protolanguages 
will be fleshed out in more detail. Hopefully what will emerge is a picture that 
increasingly becomes informed by how much research-based knowledge is brought to 
























PART 3: THE PROPOSED NATURE OF THE HOLISTIC MEANING-SIGNAL 
PAIR RELATIONSHIP 
 
3.1   INTRODUCTION 
Whilst the previous section looked at the inherent problems in establishing meaning in 
a group of protolanguage users, this section will primarily be concerned with what 
holistic units of meaning might have looked like. This will include a consideration of 
protolanguage models that link music and communication.  
Bentham’s model of language origins as we have seen stems from his 
investigations into modern English. It is, however, also tied into his overarching 
concept of utility. For the sake of clarity I will outline the basic scenario of language 




3.1.1   BENTHAM REVISITED 
In his Essay on Language (Works Vol. VIII, 1843) Bentham seems to propose that 
thought is prior to language and that language has arisen chiefly through the need to 
communicate (Works Vol. VIII, p.320-323). Further to this, language has two distinct 
but related uses which are referred to as the “purely self-regarding” and the “extra-
regarding” (ibid, p.301). The self-regarding mode of language is related entirely to the 
individual’s thoughts and ideas and is conceived of as helping “improvement of 
thought” (ibid,). The extra-regarding use of language is geared towards 
communication of thought. Moreover, it “is the use to which language is indebted for 
its existence, it was, for a long time, not only the only use actually made, but the only 
one which was even so much as in contemplation” (ibid). That is, language is seen as 
essentially a social construct, and, moreover, a tool with which “we communicate 
with others either to convey information, excite emotions, or prompt certain courses 
of action” (Stam, 1976, p.42). 
For Bentham “the primary and only original use is the communication of 
thought, the conveyance of thought from mind to mind” (Works Vol VIII, p.320). In 
the philosophy of the principle of utility (also known as the greatest happiness 
principle), objects are seen to have the property of utility if they result in an increase 
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of pleasure, benefit or happiness for the individual or community; and a 
corresponding decrease in pain or unhappiness (Honderich, 1995, p.85). Given, then, 
that we are governed by pleasure and pain, and that our actions to some extent are 
occupied with the respective increase and decrease of these states can we assume that 
Bentham saw this as a motive force in the emergence of communication? I think we 
can, given that he clearly viewed language as a function of the need to convey ones 
thoughts, and that these thoughts would largely have been occupied with increasing 
an individual’s pleasure or reducing their pain. In the context of a group, then, it 
would seem that achieving the greatest happiness principle could only be possible by 
communicating to ensure those ends.  
Having set out the uses of language in early society, but not stating an explicitly 
causal relationship between utility and language origins he goes on to describe those 
utterances: 
 
The first words must in their import, have been equivalent to whole sentences, to 
sentences expressive, for example, of suffering, of enjoyment, of desire, of 
aversion. Of this original language, the parts of speech called interjections are 
examples.                                                                      (p.322) 
 
From this communication system words that represented propositions – “the 
original sentences” – were, through a process of analysis, “as it were, broken down 
into words, these words into syllables” (p.323). The composition of these 
propositional utterances is not explicitly outlined, whether they were phonetically 
complex as Jespersen would later imagine them; or if they were composed of 
relatively simple syllabic units as is suggested by the preceding quote. Bentham does, 
however, offer the following analogy where letters are to words so were “words but 
so many fragments” of the earlier holistic utterances. 
We will leave a more detailed discussion of the route to modern language until 







3.2   A MUSICAL INTERLUDE 
 
3.2.1   DARWIN AND JESPERSEN 
In The Descent of Man (1871) Darwin proposed three stages to the evolution of 
language. The first is a development of pre-human cognition “before even the most 
imperfect form of speech could have come into use” (p.110). Darwin’s second stage 
(which Fitch (in press) calls prosodic protolanguage) involved the evolution of 
singing “producing true musical cadences” which served the functions of courtship 
and marking territory, which can be seen in analogous birdsong. Additionally, these 
songs expressed emotions such as love and jealousy (p.109). The final transitional 
stage on the way to language rests on “the imitation and modification of various 
natural sounds, the voices of other animals, and man’s own instinctive cries, aided by 
signs and gestures” (ibid).  
Darwin’s theory of a musical protolanguage seems to inaugurate a much more 
rigorous, scientific approach to the question of language origins. Earlier theories such 
as those outlined in Part 2 were addressed in a more philosophical and speculative 
manner without much recourse to empirical evidence, which, to be fair, did not exist 
in most cases. In contrast Darwin, as he had done in Origin of Species (1859), brought 
a wealth of comparative biological insight to the question. This methodological 
approach can also be seen in Jespersen’s work. He clarified, linguistically, aspects of 
Darwin’s model to put forward his own ideas with regard to linking music and 
language. Darwin’s theory is developed from the wide range of comparative data he 
gathered, particularly the insight of the analogous song learning of birds with human 
language learning (1871, pp.108-109). 
In first discussing Jespersen (section 2.3) we noted the musical characteristics of 
his protolanguage. The first three stages depicted there chart the development of 
meaning out of initially meaningless, sung phrases. The third stage might, in current 
parlance, be depicted as maintaining dyadic, interpersonal relationships. Now we 
come to the stage that can most accurately be described as holistic in nature. ‘Stage 
4’, as I have called it, might have originated to augment group cohesion: 
 
If a certain number of people have together witnessed some incident and have 
accompanied it with some sort of impromptu song or refrain, the two ideas are 
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associated, and later on the same song will tend to call forth in the memory of 
those who were present the idea of the whole situation.                         (p.440) 
                                                                          
Meaning is a group creation based on melodic, holistic utterances. Through processes 
of language change there is “a progressive tendency from inseparable irregular 
conglomerations to freely and regularly combinable short elements” (p.429). We will 
come to this in Part 4 after looking at more recent theories that appeal to musical 
origins. In particular the quote above, outlining the association of songs with 
situations, seems to foreshadow a similar hypothesis we will encounter in the next 
section. 
 
3.2.2   FITCH AND PHONOLOGY 
Championing Darwin and Jespersen, Fitch (in press) advocates a vocal-learning based 
account of language emergence. The musical route is based on a similar appreciation 
for the comparative evidence of vocal learning in other species as well as being a 
parsimonious account of phonology and vocal tract development. A major criticism of 
Wray’s model (Tallerman, 2007) has been the lack of a coherent explanation of 
phonological development (see section 3.4.1 below). 
Focusing on the congruencies between music and language Fitch (in press) notes 
the close analogy between aspects of phonology and music. Music is universal to all 
human cultures as are phonological systems; both involve a generative system of 
building phrases from small meaningless units (notes and phonemes); and both 
involve hierarchical combination (Fitch, in press, Ch.14.0, para.7). This parallel is 
fundamental to Fitch’s prosodic protolanguage theory in that it appeals to the 
convergent evolutionary evidence of species of songbird and is parsimonious in 
explaining some of the later structural elements of language. Fitch thus describes 
animal song as “bare phonology: generative, arbitrary vocalization lacking discrete 
meaning” (ibid, para.6). Because phonology has the generative feature of producing 
sequences composed of smaller units it has the ability to generate novelty, albeit 
meaningless novelty. Recent research suggests that in birds at least there is a 
patterning to song-strings that can be described grammatically with a finite-state 
syntax (Okanoya, 2002); and, more controversially, with a context-free recursive 
grammar (Gentner et al, 2006).  
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The capacity for vocal learning in evolutionarily disparate species has informed 
much recent comparative literature dealing with music and language evolution 
(Merker & Okanoya, 2007; Mithen, 2009; Fitch, in press). This vein of research 
highlights the importance of vocal learning and the nature of the ‘strings’ that are 
learnt in animal songs (Merker & Okanoya, 2007, p.406). Animal songs are distinct 
from animal calls in that the latter are largely innate and fixed in their species specific 
signalling system. Animal song, on the other hand, supplies “the raw materials for a 
learned (initially arbitrary) system of meaning assignments” (ibid, p.405). The 
impetus for finding signals that display arbitrary and combinatorial properties is the 
desire to overcome the problem of initializing a system of meaning-signal pairs – a 
problem we have encountered previously. 
Merker & Okanoya (2007, p.407) highlight the vocal aspect of song and in 
particular the capacity for vocal learning – “the learned duplication of an auditory 
model by voice” – a behaviour that is rare among mammals. The authors hint at a 
possible link between hominid brain expansion and vocal learning, citing evidence for 
this link in birds: evidence suggesting a positive correlation between the 
telencephalic-to-brain ratio and the presence of singing and vocal learning (p.408).  
Across species, animal song, achieved through a neurally supported system of vocal 
learning has been a successful evolutionary solution for communication and display. 
Found in birds, humans, whales and seals (amongst others) the comparative analysis 
reveals members of disparate taxa with analogous traits. This makes a case for a 
musical stage in language evolution more plausible. If evolution converged on this 
solution before, there is no reason to assume it couldn’t again. This is especially 
relevant when the ubiquity of music in human culture is considered.  
In the context of each species’ unique ecological and social niche vocal learning, 
while functioning as per its adaptation, will undergo different pressures in disparate 
contexts. This informs Merker & Okanoya’s (2007, p.410) thought experiment. They 
imagine a scenario where an “elaborate learned song” is in place in a mammal without 
restrictions on seasonal breeding. Thus, song, in the service of display for the purpose 
of mate attraction and territoriality, and also not tied to any fixed pattern of breeding 
“would be spread out over the full range of the groups life circumstances, initially in 
haphazard fashion” (p.411). What they propose next is that learners in this population 
would be exposed to initially meaningless (in the sense of linguistic meaning) song-
strings in different situations and would, in the course of learning, associate these 
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song-strings with a particular context. Strings would then be stored in memory 
together with the context. Iterations of this scenario over generations through the 
“learner bottleneck
2
…would ensure a gradual assortative segregation of song-strings 
by context” resulting in a repertoire of songs that is statistically shaped into a set of 
correlated song contexts (2007, p.411). This picture – not unlike Jespersen’s one 
above – is tentatively offered as a possible explanation for the emergence of meaning-
signal pairs which “is simply the context in which it is habitually sung” (ibid). A 
potential problem with this is how individuals come to have the same meaning 
associated with the same song. Although the authors don’t discuss the context in 
which learning occurs, one would assume that to tie a song to a context many 
individuals would have to experience both song-string and context together in order 
for each one to both produce a song given the stimulus of a context and to evoke a 
context in the mind of the hearer. 
This aside, the scenario is of a musical holistic protolanguage that progresses to 
modern language. How that happens will be addressed in Part 4. For now we will 
continue to look at how current research has interpreted the musical protolanguage 
hypothesis, first scientifically postulated by Darwin almost 140 years ago. 
 
 
3.2.3   MITHEN, WRAY AND HOLISTIC PROTOLANGUAGE  
The musical protolanguage theory, like the holistic counterpart, seems to have been 
resurrected at a time when greater understanding of human cognition can ground 
previous theoretical questions in convergent data. The idea of a holistic protolanguage 
has persisted and recently been supported by a number of researchers. The same 
cannot be said, as Mithen (2009) points out, of musical theories of language 
evolution. This has to do with a hitherto singular focus on the core objects of 
linguistics – words and grammar. This has, for Mithen, marginalised the potential 
discussion of the emotional lives of our pre-linguistic ancestors, which he sees as 
relevant based on evidence from infant directed speech and primate social interaction 
(2009, pp.59-60). The key is to view music, in evolutionary terms, as an emotional 
and affective strategy. With reference to great apes Mithen feels that “their social 
                                                 
2
 The learning bottleneck refers to the fact that in language transmission only a subset of the language 
can ever be heard by an individual. Therefore general structural principles will tend to survive. In the 
above context only a subset of the song-strings possible will be heard. 
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behavior cannot be understood without reference to their emotional states and how 
these are manipulated by vocalizations and physical actions” (2009: p.60). This is an 
appeal to behavioural continuity with an ancestral, pre-hominid primate species, as is 
his view that (in line with Wray, 1998) primate vocalizations are holistic “like human 
musical phrases” (2009, p.63).  
On an ontogenetic scale the prevalence of infant directed speech in all cultures 
suggests that as well as helping an infant acquire their native language through 
prosodic cues which aid word segmentation and perception of phonetic categories 
(Thiessen et al, 2005; & Werker et al, 2007); there may be an explanation that 
highlights IDS as functioning “in terms of its emotional impact on the infant” 
(Mithen, 2009, p.59). That is, the musicality of IDS may be a factor in strengthening 
the infant-caregiver bond. Given that Mithen supports the holistic protolanguage 
hypothesis (2005, ch.9 & 15) why does he further assert its musical nature? The 
following are the six reasons he gives for “a degree of musicality” in his holistic 
protolanguage: 
 
i. Anatomical evidence from the archaeological record shows the hominid 
line to have been able to make a wide variety of sounds (vocal tract 
anatomy); and a variety of gestures, including dance (bipedalism). 
ii. The ubiquity of singing and dancing in human culture serving social 
bonding purposes. 
iii. A similar prevalence of emotional expression and induction in others “by 
using vocalizations with particular pitch sequences and rhythms, and their 
equivalence in gesture and body movement”. 
iv. The increased period of neotony in humans, as a result of bipedalism 
narrowing the birth canal, led to increased infant dependency. IDS is a 
‘fossil’ of a musical strategy used in looking after infants. 
v. In line with Darwin’s theory of sexual selection singing was initially a 
display for mate attraction; the increased vocal skill was then exapted for 
protolanguage. 
vi. Evidence from contemporary traditional societies of mimicry of the natural 




Mithen’s work to date (2005 & 2009) has been to synthesize a number of ideas 
from different fields of inquiry into a unified theory of language evolution. This is his 
“Hmmmmm” model of protolanguage: Holistic, manipulative, multi-modal, musical, 
and mimetic.  
Steven Brown’s (2000) “Musilanguage” model is similar in many respects to 
Mithen’s and also shares with Fitch an appreciation of “phonological syntax” (Brown, 
2000, p.294). Along with Mithen, Brown (2000, p.278) sees in music an emotional 
function, what he calls “sound emotion”, where “particular sound patterns…are used 
to convey emotional meaning”. Both authors also share the view that language and 
music developed out of a musical communication system that was a precursor to 
modern language and music (Brown, 2000, p.277; Mithen, 2005, ch.9). However, 
whilst exploiting the combinatorial properties of phonology to support later syntax, it 
is not clear where meaning might have come from in Brown’s model. In the growing 
literature that compares language and music (see Fitch, 2005 & 2007; see also Besson 
& Schön, 2003, for a cognitive perspective), meaning is seen as a fundamental 
difference between the two domains. Nevertheless, Brown seems to view language 
and music “as fitting along a spectrum instead of occupying two discrete…universes” 
(2000, p.278). At one end of this spectrum is what Brown calls “sound reference” 
which is the semantics of language: reference and symbolic meaning. At the other end 
we find “sound emotion” where emotional meaning is conveyed by “particular sound 
patterns” (ibid). Thus, meaning is assumed in the domain of music along a spectrum 
that represents degrees of difference where others have seen musical and language 
meaning as fundamentally distinct (Fitch, 2005, p.31).  
Botha (2009) offers a sustained critique of both Mithen and Brown’s models. 
The underlying objection is a lack of clarity concerning linguistic theory. In particular 
Botha (2009, pp.66-67) cites Brown’s indeterminate definition of language as 
characteristic of the underlying faults with his model. In short Brown’s model is 
“based on various untenable assumptions about what syntax is, about what semantics 
is, and about how syntax and semantics are related to each other and to phonology” 
(p.71). Similarly, Mithen’s theory fails to account and fully explain the segmentation 
process and the emergence of syntax (although see section 4), and is thus rejected as a 
possible explanation for a linked evolutionary history between language and music. 
Having briefly looked at musical theories of protolanguage we now return to the 
work of Alison Wray.  
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3.3   ALISON WRAY 
As we have already observed, Wray (1998 & 2000) advocates a continuous 
development in the hominid line from an earlier, essentially primate system of 
communication. Based on observations of modern primates, the earlier, pre-hominid, 
system is taken to be characterized by “noise and gesture”. The “noise” is 
phonologically unstructured and lacks the physiological and articulatory control 
required to produce the vocal gestures of modern human speech. The gestures are 
functional, most often involved in dyadic exchanges to facilitate relationships, sex, 
play, grooming etc. Out of this, presumably via ecological pressures, hominid 
communication developed, which was similar to the prior system “but capable of a 
more complex inventory of functional exchanges and thus needing a larger set of 
utterances” (Wray, 1998, p.51). The noises and gestures of hominid ancestors would, 
of necessity, gradually change the vocal tract to “make more sounds available, so an 
increasing number of discrete utterances could be created” (ibid). Thus, in this way, a 
basic phonemic inventory is established as vocal articulation becomes more refined in 
the service of producing auditorially distinct utterances.  
However, one of Maggie Tallerman’s main contentions is that Wray (1998) 
assumes the “prior existence of discrete segments” that holistic utterances are 
composed of (2007, p.585); a complaint she also levels at computational models that 
explore the emergence of compositionality (Kirby, 2000). These segments are at the 
syllabic and phonetic levels of speech production: syllabic segments are recombinable 
at the utterance level to produce further distinct utterances, and phonemes can be 
recombined to produce the syllabic building blocks of utterances. The problem is, for 
Tallerman, that in the segmentation process that Wray hypothesizes there is a 
presupposition of distinct phonetic elements that go hand-in-hand with words (in the 
modern sense): 
 
you can’t have morphemes without phonemes (since morphemes are composed 
of phonemes) and you can’t have phonemes without words, since you have to 
have semantic contrasts and minimal/near minimal pairs in order to know what 
the phonemes are.                                     (Tallerman, 2007, p.587). 
 
Wray’s (1998 & 2000) theory does seem to gloss over an explanation as to how vocal 
control might have emerged in the hominid line. Especially as the fine, intentional 
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articulatory control needed to produce holistic utterances Wray envisages are 
generally not available to primates. However, Tallerman’s, suggestion that this makes 
a holistic theory of protolanguage untenable can be countered by the fact that Wray’s 
failure to adequately account for a certain aspect of the evolutionary picture merely 
requires a deeper consideration of these issues. The absence of an explanation 
concerning vocal control highlights a gap in the model rather invalidating it 
altogether.  
A related point can be made with reference to computational models that build 
in certain elements at the start. Language evolution is a complex interaction of 
processes involving, amongst other things, genetic preadaptations, natural selection, 
ecological pressures, and cultural transmission. A computer model seeks to isolate 
explananda by simplifying the problem – too many variables will render the problem 
too complex to model. In the case of Kiby (2000), to investigate the emergence of 
linguistic structure as well as the development of a modern human vocal tract, and the 
concurrent development of cognitive structures guided by natural selection would be 
far too abstruse an undertaking. Tallerman’s issues are certainly valid but not 
insurmountable. 
So now we come to the actual utterances that speakers of Wray’s protolanguage 
would use, a small sample of which is represented in table 1.1.  
 
1 /mabu/  ‘keep away’ 
2 /madu/  ‘take the stick’ 
3 /mbita/  ‘give her the food’ 
4 /ikatub/  ‘give me the food’ 
5 /kamti/  ‘give her the stone’ 
         
Table 1. Characteristic protolanguage utterances with their glosses on the right. 
Adapted from Wray (1998). 
 
From the above examples we can note a number of aspects. Firstly, there is no 
internal structure to the utterances. Examples 3-5 are glossed with the verb ‘give’ but 
no element is common to all three utterances that could stand for ‘give’. Thus they are 
holistic. Secondly, we can note a simple yet productive phonemic inventory that 
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displays wide range of distinct sounds – from bilabials (both nasal and plosive) at the 
front of the vocal cavity (/m/ and /b/) to the voiceless, velar stop at the back (/k/). The 
vowel sounds also occupy the, more or less, maximally distinct cardinal points of the 
vowel space – high back and front (/u/ and /i/); front mid and low (// and /a/). As 
well as these phonetic features there is an ability to combine meaningless but distinct 
syllabic elements – for example: /ma/, /ka/ and /m/. Thirdly, the propositional 
content of the utterances “perform the same functions as in primates, expressing and 
negotiating relationships, and inviting specific actions from others” (Wray, 1998, 
p.51).  
Tallerman (2007) has outlined the problems she sees with Wray’s account and 
by extension with holistic models of protolanguage in general. Tallerman’s own view 
is in line with Bickerton’s: “a word-based lexicon evolved by building on ancient 
conceptual categories which are likely shared by many primates” (2009, p.181).   
Although this model is a hypothetical bridge from a previous, animal 
communication system to, ultimately, modern human language it is not the whole 
protolanguage story. Wray (2002, p120) identifies “two inherent limitations on a 
holistic system, when operating alone” which constrain “the quality and type of 
message that can be sustained”. The first limitation arises from the interaction of two 
parameters which impact on the number of messages the protolanguage could 
support: the speaker and hearer’s ability to produce and perceive the holistic 
utterances; and the utterances demands upon long-term and working memory. Using a 
simplified phonetic inventory at the inception of protolanguage (which I take to be 
implicit in Wray’s model due to the incremental nature of vocal tract development she 
proposes), will constrain the number of distinctly compact messages in an individuals 
inventory. If the ‘proto-lexicon’ increases then the distinctiveness of the utterances 
will increasingly be along the length parameter of utterances, which will affect 
working memory. 
The second limitation relates to how frequently an utterance can be used without 
it disappearing during the vertical, bottleneck stage of language transmission. When 
learning a language, an infant is only ever exposed to a subset of the languages total 
utterances (Kirby, 2000), for modern human language with its infinite generative 
power it is logical that no child will ever hear all possible utterances of his or her 
language. For a holistic protolanguage, however, the issue is not so clear cut. The 
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relationship between an utterance and its meaning is not a function of its subparts and 
is therefore unique in its place in the lexicon of similar utterances. If this lexicon is 
small enough then it may well be that the infant does hear all the utterances of the 
protolanguage and transmission is a matter of learning a static list of items. However, 
the historical process is not perfect and over time replication of sounds changes, thus 
changing the utterances. Additionally, it is taken as read that the dynamic 
environment of hominids would yield new situations that were relevant enough to 
warrant an increase in the proto-lexicon and so the situation would eventually arise 
where the infant no longer hears the totality of the protolanguage.  
This has repercussions on the holistic protolanguage as a whole if the “balance 
between specificity [of a message] and resultant frequency” determines whether or 
not the message is retained in the protolanguage inventory (Wray, 2002, p.121). To 
balance this fine line it is suggested that “generic denotation” might guarantee an 
utterances fixture in the protolanguage. However, Wray goes on to reject this on the 
basis that “since the messages would determine the behaviour of the group, this 
enforced reductionism would restrict the range of pre-planned actions, encouraging 
habit over innovation” (ibid). Generic denotation creates ambiguity in the system due 
to a lack of reference between message and object (122). The holistic utterance (see 
table 1) bundles candidate referents into one non-decomposable unit making 
specificity problematic, especially with regard to displaced referents.  
Thus, Wray is in a paradoxical position: without individual denotation a holistic 
protolanguage is denied potentially useful utterances of the type “Fetch X” where “the 
message is pragmatically associated with an absent referent” (ibid). However, if there 
were individual denotation this would place a huge burden on the memory load of the 
users as the list of potentially absent people or things that could be fetched increased, 
rendering the system untenable. 
Wray’s solution (2002, 122-124) is to propose an initial holistic system as 
outlined above which is subsequently augmented by the appearance of individual 
denotation. This offers some rapprochement with Bickerton’s model as it introduces 
alongside the holistic system of communication a simple means of referring to 
specifics. Similarly, Wray does not rule out the possibility of a prior stage of manual 
communication so that her model can also encompass parts of Arbib’s. 
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3.4   MICHAEL ARBIB 
Arbib (2005b) outlines a detailed series of evolutionary stages, which show the 
development of the underlying neural structures he believes to be involved in 
language evolution. Initially these mirror neurons were proposed to be present in the 
common ancestor of monkey and human. Later the common ancestor of humans and 
chimpanzee is thought to have a more developed mirror system that allowed simple 
imitation of grasping. After the divergence of the hominid line of great apes this 
mirror system, further modified, allowed for greater complexity of imitation which 
eventually led to the appearance of what, for the purposes of this essay, I will call 
protolanguage. 
In Arbib’s scheme the protolanguage stage is actually a number of important 
sub-stages that, over their emergent trajectory, switch from the visual, manual-
gestural modality to the auditory, vocal modality. Development can be broken down 
as follows:  
 
Complex imitation  Protosign  Protospeech 
 
These are all stages occurring in the hominid line constituting Arbib’s (2005b) 
stages 4, 5, and 6 respectively. The transition from complex imitation to protosign is 
further broken down in terms of the abilities needed to support protosign. These are 
the ability “to engage in pantomime and…make conventional gestures to 
disambiguate pantomime” (2005b, p.115). Pantomime as the initial communicative 
act towards language has an advantage of being iconic in that the pantomime shows a 
similarity with the object or action depicted. The advantage lies in the perceptual 
similarities between the object and the key features acted out. According to Arbib 
(ibid) this “provides open-ended communication that works without prior instruction 
or convention”. However, it is just such conventionalization that is needed to ‘bridge 
over’ into protosign. This is achieved through gestures that disambiguate the bundle 
of different meanings that are potentially associated with pantomime. For example, if 
one were to pantomime ‘bird-flight’ they might use their arms in a flapping motion or 
just their hands; either way there is ambiguity in what is being highlighted: the bird or 
flight in general? What Arbib has proposed (2005b, p.116, 2009b) is that a class of 
disambiguating gestures were invented to make clear the intention of the pantomime. 
Thus, a new class of hand movements arose that were less iconic and approached the 
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quality of arbitrary, symbolic communication. The trade-off between easily 
recognised pantomimes and non-iconic, conventionalized gestures is “more rapid 
communication with less neural effort” (2005b, p.116). This brings us to the first 
stage proper of Arbib’s protolanguage.   
In getting to protolanguage Arbib has gone to great lengths to flesh out the 
neural structures underlying the core features that are crucial for the emergence of the 
“language ready brain”. His hypothesis is that development from the last common 
ancestor of chimpanzee and Homo sapiens was along a path that altered a system of 
neurons essential to establishing shared meanings based on initially iconic pantomime 
through a conventionalizing process to a bipartite protolanguage; one which was 
firstly gestural (manual and oro-facial), and then subsequently vocal. We have seen 
that the path to protosign was part-neural, part-cultural, evolving out of the already 
extant gestural system of previous primate communication. Why then, if we know 
from contemporary studies in sign language that it is clearly language in all its 
manifest complexity, should speech (and not gesture) come to be the dominant 
modality – indeed the default – for modern human language? 
The answer, for Arbib, lies in the fact that, of the three stages above, protosign 
and protospeech evolved in tandem. The relationship between protosign and 
protospeech in his view is one of “scaffolding” (Arbib, 2005a, p.148). Protosign 
involves manual and facial gestures; protospeech primarily involves vocal gestures 
which emerged via the scaffolding effect of the evolutionarily quondam protosign. 
The interaction proposed by Arbib occurred during the period of hominid evolution 
covering Homo habilis to Homo sapiens (roughly 1.75-0.5 m.y.a.). During this time 
  
biological and cultural evolution along the hominid line saw advances in both 
protosign and protospeech feeding of each other in an expanding spiral so 
that…protosign did not attain the status of a full language prior to the emergence 
of early forms of protospeech                      (Arbib, 2005a, p.148) 
 
it is at this protospeech stage that Arbib proposes early Homo sapiens to be using 
holistic utterances. In Part 4 we will address the hypothesis, outlined in Wray (1998) 
that the structural complexity of modern compositional language emerged through 
cultural processes. 
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PART 4: PROPOSALS FOR THE ROUTE OUT OF HOLISTIC 
PROTOLANGUAGE AND INTO MODERN LANGUAGE 
 
4.1   INTRODUCTION 
In section 2.3 we briefly encountered the principle of uniformity (uniformitarianism). 
Newmeyer (2002), in his critical survey defines it thus: “there is no overall 
directionality to language change…human languages have always been pretty much 
the same in terms of the typological distribution of the elements that compose them” 
(p.360). However, there is mounting opinion that this statement may be more 
problematic than it appears. As an antidote to the idea that a group of language 
speakers can be seen as more or less primitive based on the structure of their language 
it is commendable. And it also takes into consideration our underlying biological 
ability to acquire any language as our first. Uniformitarianism in this guise deals with 
language as used by contemporary Homo sapiens. Can the uniformity principle be 
carried over into the study of language evolution? Growing research is pointing 
towards a situation where it seems to be unfeasible to hold to certain views on 
language evolution whilst maintaining a broad uniformitarianist stance (Newmeyer, 
2002).  
In the following section we will sum up the earlier views of how protolanguage 
might have developed into modern language. Then, after discussing current thinking 
on this question (Wray and Arbib) we will look at research in the field of 
computational modelling that provides support for the emergence of compositional 
structure from initially holistic utterances. These hypotheses are implicitly non-
uniformitarian.    
 
 
4.1.1   BENTHAM, DARWIN & JESPERSEN 
As has become apparent over the course of this review the idea of a holistic 
protolanguage has persisted and recently flourished, as the weight of evidence that has 
been brought to bear on the question has increased over time. In general, 
contemporary language evolution research is multi-disciplinary, technologically state 
of the art, and in constant dialogue with the interested parties (there are now 
numerous annual conferences devoted to the question). This difference means that in 
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some areas of the literature I am addressing, current work has far more to say than 
earlier thinkers could. 
Jeremy Bentham took great pains to describe the underlying logic of language 
and applied this to his theory of language evolution. However, his conception of how 
protolanguage might have developed into the system of words and grammar used in 
modern language was less fleshed out. Of the ‘route to language’ Bentham has this to 
say: 
  
To form the words of which language is at present composed has been the work 
of analysis. The original sentences were, as it were, broken down into words, 
these words into syllables, and these syllables, by the help of written and visible 
signs, into letters. (Bentham, 1843, p.323) 
 
Burnet (1773, pp. 395-397) also held the view of a holistic protolanguage but thought 
that words of the atomistic, modern kind arose alongside the previous system through 
the purposeful invention by man. Bentham also saw the inventive hand of man at 
work, but it was applied to protolanguage in use; words arose through “the work of 
abstraction, the produce of a refined analysis” upon the holistic protolanguage 
(Bentham, 1843, p.321). This is how modern language came to be, but Bentham still 
held the view that “in ordinary discourse propositions came entire, it is only on the 
occasion of some science or art, that…any term is presented by itself” (ibid). I read 
this as meaning that our day-to-day communication is pragmatically facilitated by 
propositions and that linguistic compositionality represents a separate tier of analysis 
that can be applied to language. This is reminiscent of Wray’s (1998) conception of 
formulaic language where “a significant proportion of our day to day utterances are 
not generated by rule but retrieved whole from the store” (p.58).   
Moving the story on, Otto Jespersen (see above, pp.27-28), not unlike Merker 
and Okanoya (2007) discussed in section 3.2.1; saw shared meanings initializing with 
the co-occurrence of songs and specific contexts. Jespersen also proposed that this 
happens through the process of the analysis of existing utterances into constituent 
elements. His evidence for this claim comes from the study of grammaticalisation as 
observed by the historical linguists of the previous century. In particular Jespersen 
highlights the phenomenon of secretion: “one portion of an indivisible word comes to 
acquire a grammatical signification which it had not at first” (Jespersen, 1922, p.384). 
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Although Jespersen admits that from “the nature of the subject it is impossible to give 
more than hints” (ibid, p.440); he is clear in seeing the development of language as 
the action of the historical process working on the earlier melodic utterances. This 
theoretical position, then, is clearly non-uniformitarian in an evolutionary context. 
Protolanguage is by definition different from modern language and the transition 
between the two is a product of recognised historical processes acting on each 
generation. Also implied, if we invoke the historical process, is a certain amount of 
directionality to language change. Certain sound changes will only go in one 
direction, hence, we are able to reconstruct earlier languages (Campbell, 1998, p.115); 
and grammaticalisation changes, such as main verb > auxiliary, are similarly seen to 
be largely unidirectional (ibid, p.239). In the following section it will be clear that 
there is an underlying assumption that protolanguage developed into modern language 
after the appearance of Homo sapiens. 
 
 
4.2   THE SEGMENTATION ROUTE 
The route from a holistic protolanguage to modern human language has been 
proposed by Wray (1998, p.54) to be a purely cultural process. Moreover, Wray 
proposes that the first hominids to analyse the holistic protolanguage “used a brain 
that was fundamentally set up in the same way as ours today” (ibid). This final, 
gradual development into modern language is supported by Arbib (2005b, p.119), 
Mithen (2005) and Fitch (in press) – although Fitch (Ch.14.10, para.4) stresses a 
better fit with a musical model. As such I will focus on Wray’s position, 
supplemented by differing opinions within a similar framework.  
In her paper (1998, pp.55-58) she describes this route as segmentation. Bearing 
in mind Table 1 above (p.34) the process of segmentation is as follows. A 
protolinguistic community has an inventory of holistic utterances. For each, the 
meaning of the whole is not a function of the meaning of the parts. However, as we 
have seen the utterances are composed of a finite set of syllabic units (in the examples 
these have the form CV). In order to generate utterances to cover the range of 
expressible meanings needed in the community, it follows that the syllabic elements 
will be used repeatedly in different contexts. This can be seen from the items /mbita/ 
- ‘give her the food’; /katub/ - ‘give me the food’; /kamti/ - ‘give her the stone’. It 
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is a coincidence that /m/ occurs in two different utterances that have a recipient 
equivalent to ‘her’, and doesn’t occur in the utterance without ‘her’. Wray proposes 
that the analyser (i.e. the hearer) creates a morpheme boundary around /m/ as a 
result of ‘looking’ for a phonetic representation of Bickerton’s (1998) theta role. This 
is a prelinguistic hominid neural component involved in “conceptual structure” and 
social intelligence (1998, p.346). What Bickerton suggests is that at some point a link 
was established between perception of events involving Agents, Patients and 
Recipients and an area of the brain that represented “phonetic shapes of words” (ibid). 
Returning to Wray, however, notice that in the same three examples ‘give’ 
occurs in all three utterances but without the coincidence of a common morpheme. 
The closest is /ka/ but then /mbita/ is a counter-example. Wray suggests three 
options that might work. The community could just abandon the hypothesis that /ka/ 
stands for ‘give’; hypercorrection might occur so that /mbita/ is reanalysed as 
/mbika/; or hypercorrection could occur in the opposite direction: /mbita/ is 
dropped from the ‘lexicon’, eliminating the counter-example ‘give her the food’. 
The pressure to analyse utterances into their components and assign meaning 
presumably comes from the increasing memory load that a growing vocabulary of 
holistic utterances would create. Whilst recognising this as a possible “catalyst” Wray 
also points out that other hypotheses are compatible within a holistic framework 
(1998, p.54). Evidence that this might have been a plausible route comes from first 
language acquisition studies. Wray notes that modern human infants segment 
utterances “when the child notices the points at which otherwise identical utterances 
tolerate paradigmatic variation, and inserts morpheme boundaries.” Studies of the 
primate auditory system suggests that the ability to discriminate the sounds that 
language is composed of are not specific to humans and further, that a similar ability 
with reference to perceiving segments further up the phonological hierarchy might be 
a widespread primate adaptation (Ramus et al, 2000; Hauser et al, 2001). This ability 
may have further developed in the hominid line and become a preadaptation that was 
to serve the later protolanguage. 
This is merely a starting point towards human language. Development is 
proposed to be gradual, possibly happening over the period that Homo erectus was 
extant ca. 1.5 – 0.5 m.y.a. However, it’s not clear whether Wray is saying that Homo 
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erectus’ brain structure is “fundamentally” the same as modern Homo sapiens. 
Additionally, Wray draws on observations that children aren’t hindered by an 
incomplete analysis of language and in fact use holistic utterances in their 
productions. She notes that although “the modern child’s input is rule-
determined…the child does not begin by treating it as such”; the child takes input as 
complete holistic meanings. 
This theory of segmentation is largely supported by the interpretation of current 
linguistic evidence – language acquisition, phonological analysis, syntactic analysis 
vs. formulaic language. Recently, however, evidence that supports Wray’s view has 
come from a field of research to which we will now turn. 
 
 
4.3   SUPPORT FROM COMPUTATIONAL MODELLING 
Computational modelling has provided a powerful tool for exploring language 
evolution. It has helped isolate key parameters in the evolution and emergence of 
language and language structure. The reason for distinguishing between language and 
structure results from recent suggestions and support from models that highlight the 
interaction of different “complex adaptive systems” related to language evolution 
(Kirby & Hurford, 2001, p.122). Kirby and Hurford (ibid) identify three such systems 
involved in language: learning (ontogeny); cultural evolution (glossogeny); biological 
evolution (phylogeny).  
Another factor in the importance of computational models has been the way that 
such systems can be left to iterate over many ‘generations’ in simulations that provide 
valuable insights into possible trajectories that language evolution may have taken, 
given a suitably simplified model of the variables involved (populations, meanings 
etc.). The simulations have helped to generate guiding principles in approaching the 
question: iterated learning, learning bottlenecks, learning biases etc. These have arisen 
purely from a consideration of implementational problems in modelling language 
evolution. The outcome is that for holistic theories of protolanguage there is hitherto 
unavailable data that at least suggests a possibility for the emergence of 
compositionality out of an earlier holistic communication system over a glossogenetic 
timescale (Kirby, 2000; Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008). 
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Kirby (2000, p.317) describes a computational model the results of which show 
“the emergence from randomness of simple yet language-like syntax in a population 
that is not constrained to learn only a compositional language”. This experiment 
explores the cultural development of a simplified language-like behaviour as it is 
passed down successive generations. However, to get the ball rolling agents are 
initially linguistic-free but with an internal representation system that, given an input, 
will model it as a “rewrite” rule that expresses the simplest type of context free, non-
compositional grammar:  
 
S/<Agent = Zoltan, Patient = Mary, Predicate = Knows> ‘zoltanknowsmary’  
 
This states that the input signal on the right is represented by the rule on the left, but 
because the initial agents are ‘blank slates’, they have no way of internalizing the 
composite features of the utterance and thus their earlier meanings are holistic chunks. 
In order for meanings and signals to arise without introducing them from ‘outside’, 
the agents in a population at first randomly invent strings to represent meanings. This 
ensures that the initial language is random. 
Key features of this model are the presence of observational learning; a model of 
population turnover; the absence of selection based on communicative success (i.e. 
random); and, as we have seen, the population is non-linguistic at the start – emergent 
biases should be “purely a product of the learners and the population model” (Kirby, 
2000, p.305).  
In all of the simulation runs in this experiment a series of three stages of 
behaviour could be observed. In the first stage, after a slow initialization period, 
random invention plus random noise leads to some stability. Agents have small 
grammars representing a limited portion of the possible meanings expressible. In this 
stage there is no structure to strings as related to meaning. In the second stage both 
grammar size and the number of meanings expressible increase. During this stage, 
however, the number of meanings outstrips the number of rules in an agent’s grammar 
– that is, the rules became less tied to individual meanings and become more general, 
consequently decreasing in number. Initially any meaning would have had a separate 
rewrite rule and thus an agent’s representations would consist of a store of rewrite 
rules paired with corresponding strings.  
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Another important change associated with this stage is that the grammars 
become more complex and partially compositional with segments in the strings 
representing aspects of the meaning. For example Kirby (2000, p.314) notes in one 
run of the simulation that in the string “dceddd” meaning “S/<Agent = John, Patient = 
Tünde, Predicate = Knows>” the substring “ce” represents John.  
The third stage develops from these partially compositional grammars to stable, 
almost completely, compositional grammars. This is marked by a further increase (in 
some cases total) in the number of meanings expressible and a decrease in the size of 
an agent’s grammar. 
The conclusion to be taken from this study seems to be that generalisation, due 
to the learning bottleneck, drives the emergence of compositionality. Although 
learning a general rule will not be as easy as learning the one-to-one mapping of a 
meaning-signal pair, given that in the experiment there were 100 meanings, “the 
probability of acquiring a particular rule given a random sample of meanings 
increases with the generality of that rule” (Kirby, 2000, p.319). 
Fitch (in press), Merker & Okanoya (2007) and Wray (1998) have all cited this 
work as supporting their individual holistic frameworks. As the model also makes no 
claims about the possible nature of the signal, other than within the confines of the 




4.4   ARTIFICIAL LANGUAGE LEARNING EXPERIMENTS 
Another paradigm exploring the cultural evolution of language is Artificial Language 
Learning experiments (ALL). Pinker & Bloom (1990) have suggested that features of 
syntax are not only adaptive – they confer fitness on the individual – but that they are 
evolvable through natural selection. In contrast, models of the cultural evolution of 
language using ALL experiments suggest that languages may themselves adapt to the 
constraints of the human brain (Christiansen & Ellefson, 2002, Kirby, Cornish & 
Smith, 2008). In this view a language inhabits a niche: the brain. Our brains, like any 
other brain, have limitations in what they can do. Therefore certain features of 
language, such as the subjacency principle for example, which seem tailor-made to 
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their function, might equally be explained as an outcome of more general learning and 
memory constraints (Christiansen & Ellefson, 2002, pp.349-351).  
The results of Kirby, Cornish & Smith (2008) suggest that this scenario may be 
feasible. Their study is an ALL experiment that involves a diffusion chain system of 
communication transmission. Participants learn some behaviour from an 
experimenter; they in turn exhibit this behaviour for the next participant, and so on. 
The behaviour in question is an ‘alien’ language which is a set of picture-string pairs. 
Initially the strings are random sequences of letters assigned to a picture that is a 
combination of three parameters that can vary in three ways: shape (square, circle or 
triangle); colour (red, blue or black); and movement (horizontal, spiral or bouncing). 
Thus a picture could be a red bouncing triangle. Initially the labels attached to the 
pictures in this language are “generated and assigned randomly, and the first 
participant in the experiment is trained on this random language” (Kirby et al, 2008, 
p.10682). Because the strings are random to begin with the initial relationship of 
string to picture is holistic. For example a black square bouncing is paired with the 
string ‘kihemiwi’ (ibid). Like Wray’s examples (see table 1) no sub-part of the string 
refers to any feature of the picture, rather the whole is represented. This means that in 
order to learn the tokens in this language they have to be rote learned. However, over 
time there emerged a generalising principle which enabled participants label 
previously unseen pictures. This is due to systematic underspecification in the 
language. As items were held back from the training data it was impossible to learn 
each and every picture-string pair, this resulted in generalization. 
The second experiment in this paper involved a modification to the above set-
up. In effect homonymy was removed from the language to be learned: “If any strings 
were assigned to more than 1 meaning, all but 1 of those meanings (chosen at 
random) was removed from the training data” (ibid, p.10684). The results in 
subsequent trials showed the emergence of a structured language: “the string 
associated with a picture consists of substrings expressing color, shape, and motion” 
(ibid). The absence of ambiguity in the language appears to be important in the 
emergence of compositional structure. 
In part, the motivation for this study was scepticism “as to how well 
computational models of learning match the abilities and biases of real human 
learners” (p.10681). Placing the artificial language in the domain of human learning 
goes some way to redressing this criticism. It also provides a good fit to the general 
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model of segmentation presented in various holistic protolanguage scenarios in that 


































PART 5: CONCLUSION 
 
Protolanguages have been proposed as stages in the evolution of language in order to 
account for the seemingly insurmountable gap between animal communication and 
language. Success in how well this gap is bridged depends on our understanding of 
the problem. A single mutational event in our past that resulted in the linguistic ability 
of our species is unlikely. But, in contrast, it is hard to imagine the incremental 
evolution of the complex structure we see in language. Whether protolanguages are 
viewed as either synthetic or holistic they are a valuable heuristic for investigating 
how language came to be the way it is. Although the idea of a holistic protolanguage 
has persisted much longer than people suspect the new paradigm for exploring the 
question is of an increasing rapprochement between disciplines. Take for instance 
Hurford’s (2003) study that offers a link between the seemingly disparate studies of 
logic, neuroscience and linguistics. However, we are still a long way from reaching a 
widely accepted picture of language origins – as the holistic debate can attest. With 
this in mind then, are we in a better position than Bentham et al. to characterise with 
any certitude earlier stages of language phylogeny? 
 I think the answer is an obvious yes; we are in a much more favourable 
position from which to study language origins. Considering the extensive literature 
and technology at our disposal in contrast to that of the 18
th
 century it is remarkable 
that these early thinkers had the fortitude to embrace the question at all. 
We have to bear in mind that research is an ongoing process and that as the 
theoretical landscape changes so to do the theories themselves. But what we must also 
recognise is that the past still has a lot to offer us. Wray’s theory is illustrative of this. 
Here we can see the convergence of a number of ideas preceded by Bentham. The 
holistic nature of early language; the idea that this persists today in the form of 
Wray’s formulae and Bentham’s interjections; and the idea that holistic utterances 
were somehow broken down (segmented) and analysed into the words we are familiar 
with today. Fitch (2009) in his Language Log post acknowledges the earlier ideas of 
Darwin and Jespersen, whilst extending them to fit with what we have learned in the 
interim – about language, communication and evolution. Good ideas sometimes have 
to wait for science to catch up in order to test them. So as well as reconciling different 
scientific disciplines in addressing the question of language evolution, it seems to be 
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